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Membership ballots and the value of intra-party democracy 
 
Fabio Wolkenstein 
European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK 
Email: g.f.wolkenstein@lse.ac.uk 
 
On the face of it, membership ballots present a clear case in which intra-party democ-
racy comes into collision with core principles of representative democracy: they 
weaken the autonomy of representatives, and undermine the authority of the voters. 
In this article, I investigate whether this is correct, and whether membership ballots 
are, therefore, democratically illegitimate, using the controversial 2013 
Mitgliederentscheid in the German Social Democratic party as a critical case. I argue 
that there is nothing democratically suspect about membership ballots and mount a 
defence of intra-party democracy as intrinsically valuable, appealing to a principle of 
equal respect for persons as autonomous agents. It turns out that endorsing this prin-
ciple has two possible implications: that the content of the ballot must be open to de-
liberation, and that these deliberations should be rendered open to non-members. I 
discuss these implications and offer some institutional design guidelines.  
 
Keywords: Political parties, membership ballots, intra-party democracy, democratic 
theory, party membership 
 
 
Introduction 
In December 2013, the members of the Social Democratic party of Germany 
(SPD) voted in a membership ballot on the party’s coalition agreement with 
the centre-right CDU/CSU, the political alliance of the conservative Christian 
Democratic Union of Germany and Christian Social Union in Bavaria. A 
membership ballot is a general vote by the members of a political party on a 
single political question which is referred to them for a direct decision,
i
 and 
this particular one was proposed by the SPD’s leadership in response to 
widespread reservations about the potential coalition within the party. After 
the SPD came in second place behind the CDU/CSU in the Bundestag 
elections in September 2013, a ‘grand coalition’ between the two major parties 
would have been the most obvious way forward, but several groups within the 
SPD protested against this plan. The ballot was intended to appease the critics 
and promote party cohesion. ‘Holding the SPD together’, suggested party 
chairman Gabriel at the SPD’s federal party convention in November 2013, is 
‘more important than governing.’ii 
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 The decision to hold a membership ballot over the question of whether 
the coalition government between SPD and CDU/CSU will materialise drew 
widespread criticism. Critics from outside the party objected that the ballot 
undermines both the authority of the voters, since it gives the will of the party 
members more weight than the will of the voters, and the constitutional 
proscription of imperative mandate, since it binds representatives to decide 
according to the will of the party members. If these objections are accurate, 
then the SPD’s membership ballot presents a clear case in which intra-party 
democracy conflicts with two core principles of representative democracy. 
This raises fundamental questions about the normative legitimacy of direct-
democratic processes within parties. When, if at all, is it legitimate to permit 
ordinary party members to make decisions that are potentially are at odds with 
the preferences of the voters, and are binding for elected representatives? 
Thus, the issues raised by the SPD’s internal ballot pose a challenge both for 
political practitioners who seek to make parties more internally democratic, 
and for political scientists (like myself) who are concerned with the normative 
foundations of intra-party democracy. Can direct democracy within parties be 
combined with responsiveness to voters and a degree of autonomy for elected 
representatives, or must it yield to these ideals? 
 In this article, I look closely at the issues raised by the membership 
ballot. I take seriously the main criticisms levelled at the ballot, and ask 
whether direct democracy within parties can be defended on normative 
grounds. I begin by auditing the two just-mentioned objections: that member-
ship ballots undermine the capacity of representatives to make decisions rely-
ing on their autonomous judgment, and that they illegitimately prioritise the 
party members’ preferences over those of the voters. I reconstruct these 
objections theoretically, and go on to argue that they both misfire. Specifically 
I suggest that the autonomy of representatives is in any case constrained by 
their partisanship, and that party members and voters legitimately share 
authority over representatives. I defend the latter point by appealing to a 
principle of equal respect for persons qua self-determining agents, which 
contends that empowering party members is nothing less than a requirement of 
democratic justice. Endorsing this principle turns out to have important impli-
cations for how we think about the inclusiveness of membership ballots. In the 
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article’s final section, I discuss these implications and reflect on how 
membership ballots ought to be designed in order to meet requirements of 
justice. 
 
 
Two objections to membership ballots 
 
The argument from representatives’ autonomy 
There are two main grounds on which a membership ballot might be opposed. 
The first is that elected representatives ought to make decisions relying on 
their autonomous judgment. On this view, deferring to the party membership 
undermines the autonomy of representatives. I call this the autonomous 
representative argument.  
 This argument has practical relevance for obvious reasons. In most 
representative democracies, the principle that elected representatives ought to 
make decisions relying on their autonomous judgment has constitutional status 
(Pasquino 2001, p. 205; Urbinati 2008, p. 44).
iii
 Indeed, most democratic 
constitutions forbid so-called imperative mandate, stipulating that 
representatives must not be obliged to follow the will of the electors or other 
third parties without any possibility of modifying it. The German Grundgesetz 
(Basic Law) is no exception here. Article 38 (1) prescribes that members of 
parliament are ‘representatives of the people as a whole’ who are ‘not bound 
by mandates (Aufträge) or directives and only subject to their own conscience 
(ihrem Gewissen unterworfen)’ (for a discussion of this article and its history, 
see Müller 1966).
iv
 For this reason, several constitutional lawyers objected that 
the SPD’s membership ballot about the coalition agreement with the 
CDU/CSU is incompatible with the demands of the Grundgesetz.
v
 The main 
problem, they argued, is that § 13 (6) of the SPD’s party statute specifies that 
the outcome of a membership ballot is binding for ‘the institution [within the 
party] to which the ballot is addressed,’ which in the present case would mean 
that the ballot’s outcome is binding for the party’s representatives in the 
national legislature.
vi
 
 To understand whether this objection can be sustained, we need to look 
more closely at its theoretical foundations. Why would it be important in a 
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representative democracy that elected representatives rely on their own judg-
ment, rather than on the judgment of others? The main argument for banning 
imperative mandate is that it poses a threat to the operation of a deliberative 
assembly. This view is predicated on the idea that legislatures should be sites 
of reasoned deliberation about the national good—an idea that goes back to 
Edmund Burke (1852 [1774], p. 236), who believed that parliament ought to 
be a ‘deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole’ 
(on this view of representation, see also the canonical treatment of Pitkin 
1967). Burke’s point was that discovering what is best for society at large is 
not possible when MPs are obliged to follow the will of others—be it their 
constituents, members of their party, or other third parties.
vii
 Rather, 
representatives ought to make independent judgments on the basis of 
deliberative exchanges about the common good.
viii
 A membership ballot clear-
ly puts this kind of deliberative judgment out of reach. By committing 
representatives to act in the name of the party membership, it limits their 
capacity to decide on the basis of giving and hearing reasons for and against 
certain courses of action, thus undermining the deliberative procedure as a 
whole. 
 Could a successful challenge to intra-party referenda be mounted by 
appealing to this ideal of parliamentary deliberation? That elected 
representatives should aim at the good of the whole and make impartial 
judgments informed by rational deliberations is no doubt an attractive ideal, 
even if the degree of independence authors like Burke want to grant 
representatives has an elitist ring (on this point, see Mansbridge 2009, p. 386). 
Nonetheless, the autonomous representative argument is misleading, in that it 
overstates representatives’ capacity of independent judgment. For those repre-
sentatives who can be bound by a membership ballot are inevitably partisans, 
and this implies that their autonomy is somewhat constrained regardless of 
whether or not a membership ballot has been held. 
 What constrains the autonomy of partisan representatives is, well, their 
partisanship. As a jointly held commitment about collective action, 
partisanship structures the way in which representatives ought to relate to each 
other. The atomic ingredient of this commitment are shared, temporally 
extended intentions. Characteristically, partisans share the intention to ‘shape 
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and design political institutions in accordance with particular principles and 
aims’ (Ypi, forthcoming). This means not that each partisan individually holds 
the intention ‘I intend to fight social inequality’ (for example), and that their 
intentions mysteriously converge. Rather, each partisan holds the intention ‘I 
intend that we as partisans fight social inequality.’ This collective ‘we’ lies at 
the heart of partisanship: engaging in a political party is simply not intelligible 
if it makes no reference to similarly leaning partisans. 
 In virtue of holding shared, temporally extended intentions, partisans 
form what Margaret Gilbert has called a ‘plural subject,’ that is, a collective 
whose members are responsible to each other in the pursuit of their shared 
aims (Gilbert 2006). So conceived, it is indeed a moral requirement for 
partisans to act in conformity with their shared commitments; they owe each 
other a degree of conformity, so to speak. For, as one theorist of interpersonal 
commitments puts it, ‘having commitments means not deciding every issue 
solely on its merits, if we mean by that dispassionately adjudicating an issue 
“from nowhere,” as an objective and wholly unencumbered being would do’ 
(Stroud 2006, p. 511).
ix
 Rather, commitments constrain our ‘deliberative 
field,’ limiting the choices morally available to us. This is how partisan 
commitments work, too. They constrain the range of possible courses of action 
representatives may pursue. 
 In legislatures, the site of partisan activity we are mainly concerned 
with here, the force of partisan commitments is palpable especially when 
representatives vote. For representatives, the field of available options is 
constrained in obvious ways. Typically they vote with their party, or with their 
party and the party or parties it forms a coalition with.
x
 That they cast deviat-
ing votes is an exception to the rule: ordinarily a product of internal 
squabbling rather than a demonstration of their capacity for full unconstrained 
judgment as envisaged by the autonomous representative argument. In cases 
of disagreement, party leaders or party whips can enforce party discipline to 
ensure that representatives toe the party line (for an empirical study, see e.g. 
Kam 2009). They can articulate collective aims, and so instil shared intentions 
in representatives.
xi
 
 If what I have said up to this point is on the right track, then there is 
little reason to believe that representatives would vote more in line with their 
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party after an internal ballot than they would do without such a ballot. Indeed 
it seems that the autonomy of representatives is always constrained to some 
degree: so long as they are partisans, they are bound by certain shared com-
mitments. A similar conclusion was reached by the German Constitutional 
Court in its summary judgment of December 6, 2013. Reacting to the criticism 
levelled at the SPD’s ballot, the court ruled that the referendum is not uncon-
stitutional, since it does not produce a stronger obligation for representatives 
to vote in line with their party than the norms of party loyalty which are in any 
case in place.
xii
 
 A question that might be asked here is this: if representatives are 
always constrained in their autonomy by partisan commitments, wouldn’t this 
still involve a violation of the ban on imperative mandate? There seems to be a 
deep-seated tension between partisanship and free mandate. Yet partisanship 
and free mandate conflict only on an interpretation of representative autonomy 
that may be termed strong free mandate. This is the conception of 
representative autonomy which Burke preferred,
xiii
 and the above-mentioned 
critics of the SPD’s internal ballot seemed to have appealed to. It evokes an 
ideal of parliament as a deliberative assembly in which individual 
representatives make independent judgments based on reasoned deliberation 
about common ends. As we saw, however, this individualistic conception of 
legislative deliberation is empirically implausible, since partisanship shapes 
the actions of representatives in important ways. But not only that: it is also 
inappropriate as a normative ideal.  
 There are several normative arguments that speak against the ideal of a 
non-partisan legislature as prescribed by the strong free mandate view. One is 
that the absence of partisanship would make it very difficult for voters to hold 
parties and legislatures accountable. Without a degree of party unity, voters 
will arguably have a hard time figuring out whether the party they voted for is 
acting in accord with its election pledges and its general programmatic 
commitments. We may also argue, with Nadia Urbinati, that a non-partisan 
legislature would not only undermine accountability but indeed the wider 
purposes of political representation, for ‘if election were truly a selection 
between and of single candidates—between and of individual names rather 
than political group names—representation would vanish because each person 
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would run for him or herself alone and would in fact become a party of his or 
her own interests’ (Urbinati 2008, p. 39). If these arguments are correct, then 
we have good reasons to reject the idea of a non-partisan assembly, and with it 
the strong free mandate view. 
 A better way of thinking about the autonomy of representatives is what 
I call the weak free mandate view. In this view some loss of independence is 
acceptable, since on balance the benefits of partisanship outweigh the loss of 
some ability to deliberate on the part of representatives. This idea is mirrored 
in Article 38 (1) of the German Grundgesetz, which states, to repeat, that 
members of parliament ought to be ‘only subject to their own conscience,’ and 
thereby leaves room for all kinds of commitments. The point here is simply 
that representatives must in principle be free to make decisions that run 
counter to the party line without facing sanctions (see Müller 1966, pp. 10-13). 
But they may well be ‘partisan by conscience,’ and accept all the 
responsibilities this involves, without thereby violating free mandate. With 
this more relaxed—and more intuitively plausible—definition of free mandate 
in hand, we can see that partisanship and free mandate are fundamentally 
compatible. 
 Perhaps the reader thinks that this argument misses an important 
distinction. Is following one’s partisan conscience not quite different from 
following a binding decision by the party members? Recall that § 13 (6) of the 
SPD’s party statute stipulates that the outcomes of membership ballots are 
binding for ‘the institution to which the ballot is addressed.’ Contrary to what 
I suggested up until this point, this seems to imply that representatives have no 
room at all to ‘follow their conscience.’ However, it is important to understand 
that the constitutional principle that representatives must be ‘only subject to 
their own conscience’ comes in as a safeguard here, warranting that individual 
MPs can vote against the party members’ decision if they see fit. Indeed, since 
the demands of the Grundgesetz overrule those of the SPD’s party statute, § 
13 (6) of the latter does not apply with full force in the present case. Even if 
MPs who vote contrary to a membership ballot’s outcome may face sanctions 
within the party (sanctions they may be able effectively to contest appealing to 
the Grundgesetz), that outcome cannot be binding in the sense that it suspends 
the constitutional ban on imperative mandate. Granted that there is a concep-
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tual difference between making a decision based on one’s political conscience 
and making a decision based on formal rules that bind one to decide in a cer-
tain way, that difference simply does not matter here.
xiv
  
 The conclusion to take from examining these arguments is that the ob-
jection that a membership ballot constitutes an illegitimate constraint on the 
otherwise-warranted autonomy of MPs fails. A membership ballot does not 
constrain the autonomy of representatives more than their partisan commit-
ments, and these commitments are fully compatible with free mandate. So if 
such a referendum is wrong, it is not because it undermines the autonomy of 
representatives—or because anything less than wholly autonomous 
representatives would be unacceptable in a representative-democratic 
legislature. 
 
The argument from voters’ authority 
Let’s turn now to the second, and more weighty, objection to membership 
ballots. This contends that elected representatives ought to aim at the good of 
the voters, as judged by the voters. On this view, deferring to the party 
membership undermines the voters’ legitimate authority. I call this the voter 
authority argument. 
 Arguments of this kind figured prominently in the debates surrounding 
the SPD’s membership ballot. Several commentators criticised that giving 
ordinary party members the power to decide whether the government coalition 
between the SPD and the CDU/CSU will materialise compromises the ‘will of 
the voters,’ who were generally interpreted to have voted in favour of a grand 
coalition.
xv
 Some critics worried that a membership ballot would in fact 
introduce a form of ‘two-tier suffrage’ (Zweiklassenwahlrecht), in which the 
preferences of the party members are given more weight than the preferences 
of the voters.
xvi
 So the issue we have to address is whether the ideal of 
representation on which the voter authority argument rests is defensible on 
normative grounds. For whether the argument has traction as a challenge to 
membership ballots depends on the soundness of the idea that representatives 
should follow the voters’ will as closely as possible. 
 Democratic folk morality is generally unambiguous about the duty of 
elected representatives to act in line with the voters’ preferences, and so is the 
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larger part of mainstream empirical political science, especially scholars 
working on representation and accountability (Rehfeld 2009, p. 217). The 
scholars in question typically assume a delegate model of representation, in 
which representatives ought to rely not so much on their own judgment as on 
the judgment of the voters. In this model, representation begins upstream from 
election day, when candidates ask citizens for their vote, making all sorts of 
promises and assurances. As representation theorists rightly point out, these 
transactions are normatively significant. When citizens accept a candidate’s 
promissory commitments, or take her ‘at her word,’ this generates obligations 
that ‘follow the candidate to the legislature,’ constraining the way in which 
she may permissibly act (Beerbohm, forthcoming).
xvii
 If the elected candidate 
flouts these obligations, voters are warranted in experiencing negative reactive 
attitudes. As a consequence, they may refuse re-election, which means that 
they can effectively sanction normatively objectionable behaviour on the part 
of representatives (Mansbridge 2003, p. 516). So even if a representative does 
not have intrinsic reasons to observe her obligations, the threat of not being 
reelected provides a strong extrinsic motivation to conform. (One need 
scarcely add that this concept of representation is diametrically opposed to the 
concept of representation the autonomous representative argument employs.) 
 The delegate model of representation finds its most formal and robust 
expression in the so-called ‘parliamentary chain of delegation,’ in which ‘vot-
ers delegate to individual [partisan] members of parliament, members of par-
liament to parliamentary majorities, parliamentary majorities to a prime minis-
ter, a prime minister to policy makers in the cabinet and cabinet ministers to 
civil servants’ (Neto and Strøm 2006, p. 623). With this conception of 
representative government in hand, we can see clearly why membership 
ballots are objectionable from the perspective of the voter authority argument: 
in the formal chain of delegation, there is simply no place for party members’ 
interventions; the vector of delegation points directly from the voters to the 
representatives (see Müller 2000, p. 312). Therefore, a membership ballot 
would constitute an illegitimate interference in the process of preference 
transmission from voters to representatives. 
 The main problem with this model is that it turns a blind eye to the 
internal life of parties. By reducing parties to their parliamentary arm, it 
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brackets out important intra-party procedures through which party members 
make demands on the future actions of representatives in a way that limits the 
authority voters exercise over them. Chief amongst these procedures are 
candidate selection practices. In most political parties, ordinary party members 
select (either in person or through delegates) who will run for the party in the 
next election. This is also true in the case of the SPD, the party we mainly 
focus on here (Hazan and Rahat 2010, p. 46).
xviii
 And just like in electoral 
representation, candidate selection involves normative transactions between 
party members and would-be candidates upstream from ‘selection day,’ which 
create obligations for future candidates. Suppose an aspiring candidate articu-
lates a set of political aims vis-à-vis the internal selectorate in order to win 
their support. Her argumentation might look something like this: ‘I intend that 
we achieve G together. This requires that you support my candidacy.’ If the 
selectors accept the candidate’s commitment, the candidate incurs a responsi-
bility to act in such a way as to achieve G if she is elected into the legislature. 
If the candidate flouts her obligations, party selectors may refuse to reselect 
her in the next election, perhaps even launch a collective effort to thwart her 
candidacy. So party members too have sanctioning powers at hand that give 
them considerable authority over representatives. 
 One way of looking at this is to say that voters and party members are 
co-principals. They both exercise authority over representatives, which is 
grounded in obligation-generating transactions between the different parties, 
and bolstered by the principals’ sanctioning powers.xix This gives us reason to 
question the voter-centrism of the voter authority argument. If the authority 
voters exercise over representatives is not absolute, but shared with party 
members, might it be permissible to commit representatives to act in line with 
the preferences of the latter in the case of membership ballots? 
 It is indeed permissible; or so I want to argue in what follows. Some 
readers, however, may want to resist the argument from co-principalship. In 
line with academic critics of intra-party democracy, they might insist that rep-
resentatives should do first and foremost what the voters want, regardless of 
whether or not they incur obligations vis-à-vis the party members prior to 
election day. To justify this claim, they could appeal to the brute fact that the 
voters are many, and argue that the numerous have a kind of moral claim to 
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democratic authority simply by their numbers. (At several stages in the debate 
surrounding the SPD’s internal ballot, critics put forward arguments to this 
effect.
xx
) For such objections to succeed, however, one would also have to as-
sume that voters and party members hold conflicting preferences, perhaps 
even that their preferences develop on separate tracks, largely uninformed by 
one another (for such a view, cf. Katz and Cross 2013, p. 171).
xxi
 
For if there 
were a broad overlap in the preferences of party members and voters, surely 
there would be nothing contemptible in empowering party members: indeed, it 
would then strengthen the voters’ position if members could exercise direct 
influence on the party’s decisions and monitor the actions of 
representatives.
xxii
 
  
An instrumental justification of intra-party democracy 
One possible reply to this objection is that voters and party members are not as 
different from one another as it might seem. Empirical studies of party 
members reveal that they are, ideologically and sociologically, much more 
like members of the general public than many critics of intra-party democracy 
are willing to admit (see Norris 1995; Scarrow and Gezgor 2010; Scarrow 
2014, pp. 210-211; van Haute and Gauja 2015). That ordinary party members 
are ideological ‘purists’ might be true in some cases, but there is little 
evidence that this is a general tendency. Furthermore, the party members who 
are most likely to participate in internal decision-making procedures will 
probably be active members, who are typically organised in local party 
organisations. These organisations tend to be directly in touch with the voters 
on the ground and so particularly sensitive to their demands and concerns 
(Clark 2004; Wolkenstein, forthcoming). Contrary to what critics of intra-
party democracy usually claim, then, the fact that party members exercise 
some authority over elected representatives might indeed help parties to repre-
sent their voters’ interests, as I have suggested in the previous paragraph; it 
may reinforce, rather than undermine, the voters’ authority. If this is correct, 
then it seems that the co-principalship of party members and voters can be 
defended on the grounds that allowing party members to exercise influence 
over representatives ultimately strengthens the position of the voters.
xxiii
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 The problem with this reply is that its logic runs dry once the aims and 
preferences of voters and party members are out of sync. The authority party 
members exercise over representatives benefits voters only insofar as 
members de facto hold views that are similar to theirs (or are willing to act as 
delegates of the voters even if they disagree with them). Now, as I have said, it 
is generally atypical that the interests of voters and party members are 
completely at odds. But when divisive issues are at stake conflicts may ensue, 
both between party members and voters and within each group. This renders 
arguments justifying representatives’ responsibilities towards ordinary party 
members on such ‘instrumental’ grounds susceptible to the objection that they 
fail once disagreements between party members and voters arise. To pre-empt 
such objections, a stronger argument in support of those responsibilities is 
needed. 
 
An intrinsic justification of intra-party democracy 
Such an argument, I suggest, must appeal to the intrinsic value of intra-party 
democracy. This consists in the fact that intra-party democracy instantiates 
equal respect for the concerns of the party members. On this view, involving 
members in internal decision-making mechanisms (like candidate selection 
procedures) has a moral claim as a way of recognising their democratic 
political equality. Arguments of this kind are familiar from standard theories 
of democracy. Theorists defending democracy on the grounds of its intrinsic 
value treat equal respect (ER) for persons qua autonomous, self-governing 
agents as a central normative principle for the design of public political insti-
tutions. 
 Let’s rehearse the argument in support of ER as an institutional design 
principle, as formulated by Thomas Christiano (2004, p. 276). Justice, the 
argument runs, requires public equality, and so ‘demands equal respect for the 
judgment of each.’ This is instantiated in ‘equality in voting power, equality of 
opportunities to run for office, and ideally equality of opportunities to partici-
pate in the processes of negotiation and discussion that lead up to voting (p. 
275).’ Excluding people from participating in democratic procedures, on the 
other hand, is intrinsically unjust, for ‘[a]nyone who is excluded from partici-
pation (…) can see that his or her interests are not being taken seriously and 
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may legitimately infer that his or her moral standing is being treated as less 
than that of others (p. 276).’ 
 The intrinsic value-argument for intra-party democracy contends that 
all of this applies to the internal life of parties too, and applies for largely the 
same reasons. Because justice requires equal respect for the judgment of each, 
parties ought to involve their members in internal decision-making 
procedures. Those who are excluded from these procedures can legitimately 
infer that their moral standing is being treated as less than that of others, 
notably of those wielding power within the party. Now if justice requires that 
party members are involved in internal decision-making procedures, it seems 
that the responsibilities these procedures generate for representatives can be 
defended as the legitimate product of transactions that instantiate democratic 
justice. 
 Note that to make the point that intra-party democracy is intrinsically 
valuable, I need not claim that the instrumental argument in support of intra-
party democracy is objectionable as a whole. For my own part, I am not un-
sympathetic to the instrumental argument, and I think that strengthening the 
connection between citizens and government is one of the most important 
functions intra-party democracy can serve. What I want to suggest is simply 
that for the reasons given above, the fact that the ‘co-principalship’ of party 
members and voters may enhance the link between voters and representatives 
is not sufficient to justify intra-party democracy. The intrinsic value argument 
provides a stronger, more compelling defence of the shared authority of voters 
and party members. 
 Someone might hold against the intrinsic justification of intra-party 
democracy that political parties and democracy at large need not be congruent 
in their values. ER, it might be said, may well inform our intuitions about 
democracy on a large scale, without it following that it should apply to 
political parties too. To make this point, however, the objector would have to 
show why we should grant parties this status. The most obvious strategy would 
be to argue that parties belong in a field of institutions and social relations 
where principles of justice do not apply directly, and ‘local justice’ holds sway 
(i.e. civil society). Using Rawlsian language, it may be said that parties belong 
in the ‘background culture’ of society, and not in the ‘basic structure.’ 
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 But while it may plausibly be argued that the content of party politics 
and the motivation for partisan engagement arise in the ‘background culture,’ 
it is hard to think of a good reason why parties themselves should be seen as 
fully belonging there.
xxiv
 One straightforward argument for why parties 
should not be seen as part of the ‘background culture’ is often mentioned 
in the analysis of the organisational development of political parties in the 
empirical literature on the topic: as organisations, parties tend to be 
closely entwined with the state. Katz and Mair (2009, p. 755), two empirical 
scholars at the forefront of research on the changing relationship between 
parties and the state, have catalogued numerous ways in which parties are 
becoming ‘ever more dependent on rules and laws laid down by government’ 
(which they devise themselves) as well as ‘much more obviously defined by 
their institutional roles.’ What their findings reveal is that parties often enjoy 
direct access to the state machinery, make their own laws, and use patronage 
for the delivery of policy on behalf of the state.
xxv
 This means that parties 
exercise important autonomy-infringing powers that were traditionally the 
prerogative of the state, thus acting effectively as ‘basic structure’-institutions. 
It may, therefore, reasonably be said that at least insofar as parties are (as Katz 
and Mair suggest) institutions of the state, principles of democratic justice 
ought to guide the design of party organisations. 
 One could object to this argument that party members still engage in 
parties on a voluntary basis, which makes norms for the internal governance of 
parties less stringent (on such a view, cf. Sangiovanni 2007, p. 12). For one, it 
might be argued that party members have viable alternatives to membership 
which are not excessively burdensome. If they dislike their party’s internal 
rules, they can join another party or form a new party. This means that 
demanding to be treated as an equal is not an entitlement party members can 
rightfully claim, at least not on the grounds of justice. 
 However, one should be cautious with overstating the viability of 
alternatives to membership. Not only is forming a new party an extremely 
costly, and likely unsuccessful, enterprise due to the institutional constraints 
emerging parties ordinarily face (cf. Stoll 2013). It is also not unlikely that for 
persons who, like most party members, are strongly committed to a specific 
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political party, forming a new party or joining a different party is simply out of 
the question. Analogous to the ‘voto di appartenenza,’ their membership is an 
expression of deep solidarity and identification with the party, which is to 
some degree independent of policy agreement. Indeed, it seems not 
exaggerated to say that for some partisans, the ability collectively to shape and 
design political institutions through participating in their party is essential for 
acting on their plan of life. For them, the party performs the function of a 
lasting associative relation which ‘coordinates future action both on behalf of 
their future selves and of similarly committed others’ (Ypi, forthcoming). So I 
would argue that, at least in some cases, alternatives to membership may 
actually prove ‘excessively burdensome’ for party members. 
 Of course, even assuming that this is correct, someone might suggest 
that whether party members can rightfully claim to be treated as equals 
depends entirely on whether they voluntarily consented to the party’s internal 
rules of governance. Since they joined the party having some idea of these 
rules, it may be said, they have given their consent and so waived their 
entitlement to equal treatment. (Cordelli [forthcoming] notes rightly that if one 
thinks that this is the sense in which voluntariness blocks egalitarian demands, 
then many voluntary associations would not meet this condition. ‘We do not 
explicitly consent to all the terms of churches and we may be compelled to 
join trade unions.’) 
 A reply to this argument will have to turn upon a previous theory of 
contractual obligation. If one thinks that coercion-free consent is a sufficient 
condition for a contract to have moral force, one may be inclined to believe 
that party members indeed waive their entitlement to be treated as equals 
when they join a party, even if their consent is only tacit. But there are reasons 
to believe that one cannot consent to everything and that even actual consent 
may be invalidated in some cases. For instance, it is often said that one cannot 
consent to enslavement, or that persons who consent to become citizens of a 
country different from their original one cannot waive their entitlements to 
equal treatment. These two examples are only on the far end on a continuum 
of things one cannot reasonably consent to, however. I submit that party 
members can also not genuinely consent to being treated as morally inferior 
by a self-interested party elite that aims to ‘drown out the activists’ to sustain 
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its power, as is often the case in parties that are internally undemocratic (Katz 
and Mair 2009, p. 759). Even an explicit consent to such subjection to elite 
rule would seem to have no normative force. For these types of agreement, 
once regarded as permissible, undermine the most basic norms of political and 
moral equality (cf. Cordelli, forthcoming).  
 It seems, therefore, that demands of equal respect retain their moral 
force within political parties independently of members’ consent at entrance, 
and independently of possible exit-options. This means that the procedures of 
internal democracy that generate obligations for representatives vis-à-vis the 
members of their party can indeed be defended on the grounds that they 
instantiate ER. There is nothing normatively suspect about the fact that party 
members and voters jointly exert some authority over representatives. From 
this, it follows that the argument that a membership ballot compromises the 
authority of the voters fails too. A membership ballot is not an illegitimate 
constraint on the authority of the voters, since voters and party members are 
legitimate authority-sharers in relation to elected representatives. Once we 
acknowledge the full complexity of the chain of delegation, and accept that 
representatives can incur obligations towards ordinary members, appeals to 
the unconstrained authority of the voters ring hollow. 
 
 
The demands of inclusiveness and institutional design 
On the face of it, the intrinsic justification for intra-party democracy I have 
advocated seems sufficient to justify the use of membership ballots. For if 
involving party members in internal decision-making procedures can be 
defended by appealing to ER, by implication this defence extends to all 
internal decision-making procedures. What the intrinsic argument for intra-
party democracy furthermore suggests is that there is nothing normatively 
problematic in members and voters holding different preferences about policy 
issues. If, as I have argued, the normative transactions that ground the princi-
pal-agent relationships between voters/party members and representatives 
legitimately confer action-guiding obligations onto representatives, it seems 
also legitimate that these obligations direct representatives to different kinds 
of action. This implication is important because it suggests that membership 
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ballots are legitimate even if party members’ preferences concerning the issue 
on which the ballot is held differ radically from the preferences of the voters 
concerning that issue. 
 One might question however whether this conclusion not ultimately 
conflicts with the demands of ER. After all, if ER requires that political insti-
tutions show equal respect for the judgments of persons qua self-determining 
agents, it seems to follow that the voters’ preferences must be taken equally 
seriously by the party. So even if it is perfectly legitimate that members 
exercise authority over elected representatives, parties ought not simply ignore 
the voters’ judgments prior to a membership ballot. Rather than favouring one 
principal (the members) over the other (the voters), parties ought to show 
equal recognition for the judgments of both principals. 
 Let’s accept this argument as it stands for the time being. How could 
equal recognition be achieved in practice? One obvious strategy would be to 
institutionalise a ‘pre-ballot deliberative procedure’ in order to mediate be-
tween the two principals. Such a procedure would show recognition for the 
equal standing of voters and party members in that it gives them the 
opportunity to balance their respective arguments against each other before the 
members go on to make a binding decision. If, for example, the members and 
voters of party X disagree over policy P, the party could invite voters to partic-
ipate in internal fora, in which they can present their arguments concerning 
that policy and hear the counter-arguments of the party members. Ideally, 
party members and voters would in the end reach some sort of integrative 
compromise, agreeing on a mutually advantageous course of action. 
 In some respects, the just-described scenario mirrors the situation in 
Germany prior to the SPD’s membership ballot which serves as our critical 
case in this article. According to a survey fielded in the week before the refer-
endum, 78 per cent of the party’s voters and 85 per cent of its members sup-
ported the grand coalition between SPD and CDU/ CSU.
xxvi
 
Those who took 
issue with the potential coalition were generally voters and members who 
stand ideologically further to the left than the majority of the party’s support-
ers and are at unease with the some of the key social and economic policies 
proposed in the coalition agreement.
 
Inside the party, it was in particular the 
JUSOS (the SPD’s youth organisation, which leans traditionally more to the 
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left than the rest of the party) who rebelled against a cooperation of the two 
parties, objecting that the coalition agreement would block the progressive po-
litical change the SPD should aim at.  
 If we would apply ER here, what would follow? By and large, the in-
stitutional prescription would look much the same as in our hypothetical sce-
nario: the party would have to offer a procedure in which arguments for and 
against could be articulated and debated. Only in this way, it seems, could 
equal respect be paid to all the available judgments. 
 The SPD approached the problem broadly in line with this prescrip-
tion. Recognising the necessity to mediate between the different groupings, it 
organised ‘members’ conferences’ in each federal state in the weeks before the 
ballot, which allowed large numbers of members to debate the terms of the 
coalition pact with each other as well as with the party leadership.
xxvii
 
These 
conferences not only gave the members a platform to explain their (partly con-
flicting) positions to one another. They also provided an opportunity for the 
party leadership to elaborate the reasons for why they support the grand coali-
tion, compelling them to engage in two-way communication with the members 
on the ground. In this process, a wide range of different opinions were voiced 
and heard, reflecting the diversity of opinion among party members and the 
wider electorate.
 
While some party members, notably the already-mentioned 
JUSOS, remained sceptical about the coalition agreement, there can be no 
doubt that involving the party membership in inclusive deliberations about the 
terms on which the future coalition should proceed greatly enhanced the 
legitimacy of the members’ decision ultimately to endorse the coalition 
agreement.
xxviii
 
 But of course, the SPD permitted only party members to participate in 
the pre-ballot deliberations over the coalition agreement, and this gives rise to 
the objection that the procedure at least partially violated ER. For if we are to 
instantiate equal respect for persons qua autonomous, self-governing agents, 
arguably such procedures must be open to anyone. The party cannot plausibly 
be conceived as a bounded space. This also implies that the prior suggestion of 
including only party members and the voters of the party (in their capacity as 
co-principals of representatives) in pre-ballot deliberations is in tension with 
ER’s normative demands. Instead, the procedure would have to be open to all 
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citizens. Thus, a final question that needs to be addressed is whether respect 
for persons qua self-determining agents is compatible with excluding citizens 
from internal deliberations, and if so, where the line could permissibly be 
drawn.  
 The answer to our question might seem obvious. Insofar as it is not 
possible to restrict opportunities of political participation to a limited number 
of people and show respect for the judgments of all, parties indeed violate ER 
when, like the SPD, they deny citizens without formal party attachment the 
right to participate in pre-ballot procedures. If we follow the logic of ER to its 
conclusion in other words, we should have to say that these procedures must 
generally be open to non-members. 
 But though this proposal is conceptually coherent, at least two 
arguments can be given to show why making pre-ballot deliberations 
maximally inclusive is a less desirable solution than imposing limits on who is 
permitted to participate. First, allowing every citizen in a given jurisdiction to 
participate in pre-ballot deliberations runs the risk of making these 
deliberations overinclusive. Overinclusiveness occurs when people are 
included in a democratic procedure whose inclusion is counter-intuitive. Think 
for example about the inclusion of members of a rival party, who might have a 
strategic incentive to push for a decision that undermines the party’s future 
electoral success. This is a well-known problem in American open primaries, 
where voters hostile to the party sometimes vote for a weaker candidate to 
give their own party an advantage (a practice known as ‘raiding,’ see 
Muirhead 2014, pp. 153-156), and it is likely to affect pre-ballot procedures 
too if they are open to anyone. Undeniably, this conflicts with our intuitions 
about the necessity of organisational integrity: including those who have 
reason to undermine the party would turn parties into larger deliberative as-
semblies that lose much of their partisan character, and from there it is only a 
short step to abolishing parties altogether.  
 This leads to the second argument: it may be said that widening 
involvement to non-members at key moments is unfair on those who have 
generally devoted themselves more to the party: the party’s most committed 
members.
xxix
 It is unfair not solely because it violates a principle of 
interpersonal morality like ‘appreciation for other people’s efforts’ but 
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because it constitutes a breach of a principle of fair return (which applies in 
addition to ER). A fair return obligation arises, I suggest, because by 
continuously promoting the party’s goals, the committed members 
intentionally benefit others (e.g. their fellow partisans and the party elite), and 
because they incur costs, as political commitment entails many sacrifices 
(e.g. investing considerable amounts of time). It therefore seems reasonable 
to say that the party’s most committed members ought to be given a different 
status than non-members, one that attaches special entitlements to their 
position. Indeed, even if the party members in question do not expect any 
returns from their activities—they might act purely out of solidarity with 
the party (see above)—it would seem wrong to treat those who have 
invested their efforts and energies into promoting the party’s goals in a coor-
dinated and continuous fashion in the same way as those who have merely 
voted for the party in elections, let alone those who routinely support rival 
parties. 
 So it seems that we need to find a way of balancing the normative de-
mand that parties ought to include every citizen in their internal deliberations 
against the intuition that the number of those who get to have a say should be 
restricted. This is a challenging task, and it seems that there is no 
straightforward route to follow. One possible way forward is to operationalise 
ER not in terms of fully equal treatment but in terms of proportionality. Brig-
house and Fleurbaey (2008) offer an intuitively appealing way of thinking 
about this, one that is consistent with the democratic ideals upheld in this ar-
ticle. They argue that equality in decision-making is less important than 
influence proportional to stakes in the decision—the higher the stakes, the 
stronger the participatory entitlements a person or group of people ought to 
have. This is what ER actually demands.  
 Let us look more closely at this strategy. If we want to operationalise 
ER via proportionality and make the case that access to intra-party procedures 
should be restricted to party members (or the most committed party members, 
anyway), then we would have to show that party members have the greatest 
stakes in the decision in question. Now it might be possible to argue that party 
members do have the greatest stakes in any intra-party decision since in 
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contrast to the wider population the outcomes of those decisions impact on 
their identity as partisans, which may shape their plans of life in important 
ways. But it is hard to deny that many decisions taken within a party also 
impact on the interests of many voters and members of the wider citizenry, 
perhaps even more profoundly than they impact on the interests of partisans. 
In any case, if the answer to the question of who should be included in a pre-
ballot procedure depends on who has (the greatest) stakes in the decision, the 
answer will vary depending on what the decision is about. Thus conceiving 
ER in terms of proportionality pushes us towards a more complex conclusion 
than simply restricting participation in intra-party procedures to party mem-
bers. 
 One problem with determining who has stakes in a decision is of 
course that for most decisions people will reasonably disagree over stakes. 
Who is affected, in what way, and how much is often heavily contested and 
cannot be settled once and for all. It is, one might say, an essentially political 
question. Does that mean that the proportional approach to ER can only get off 
the ground if we possess an uncontroversial metric for measuring stakes 
(which arguably doesn’t exist)? It does not. Rather, as Valentini (2014, p. 795) 
suggests, the proportional approach to ER can get off the ground when ‘there 
is some reasonable agreement on stakes.’ That is, ER qua participation 
proportional to stakes can be a useful guide for questions of inclusion in 
democratic procedures in cases where it would be unreasonable to deny that 
certain people have great stakes in a decision. 
 The implication for membership ballots is that in decisions where it is 
more or less uncontroversial that certain non-members have great stakes, those 
non-members ought to be included in pre-ballot deliberations. By way of 
illustration, suppose a membership ballot is held in order to determine the 
party’s position on disabled access to public spaces.xxx In this case, it would be 
unreasonable to deny that the decision has a greater impact on disabled people 
than on the rest of the population. Thus, the right of the party to exclude 
disabled non-members is weakened by those particular non-members’ stakes 
in the decision. The party would therefore have to include people with 
disabilities in pre-ballot deliberations, letting them present their views and 
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explain why they think as they do. Only in this way can the party ensure that 
equal respect is paid both to all those who have stakes in the decision.  
 But of course, there are very few decisions in which the distribution of 
stakes is thus clear-cut. As I said, typically the question of who has stakes in a 
decision is highly contested and cannot be settled conclusively. When that is 
the case, I suggest, it is permissible to restrict participation to party members, 
following the arguments for a restrictive approach I have presented above. 
This in fact follows logically from Valentini’s point that the proportionality 
approach to ER can only effectively be employed when there is reasonable 
agreement on stakes: giving people a say roughly proportional to their stakes 
is simply not feasible when there is no agreement on what their stakes are. 
(And simply assuming roughly equal stakes seems rather implausible for the 
reasons we have just examined.) This was also the case in the membership 
ballot on the coalition agreement between SPD and CDU/CSU, our critical 
case in this article. Of course, insofar as a coalition agreement between two 
parties determines positions on a wide range of political questions, it impacts 
on the interests of most, if not all, citizens of the polity in question. But how 
and how much it impacts on whom is far from clear, not least because the 
general policy direction determined in a coalition agreement is quite different 
from the concrete laws and policies that will be made over the course of the 
future legislative term. So it is hard to think of a fair and plausible way in 
which individual persons or groups of people could have been involved in the 
SPD’s pre-ballot deliberations proportional to their stakes in the decision. In 
light of this, it would indeed seem that restricting participation in the 
deliberative procedure preceding the ballot to party members, as the SPD did, 
is permissible. If there is one respect in which the SPD’s ballot is open to 
criticism, then it is perhaps that both party members and party elites have paid 
insufficient attention to the question of non-members’ stakes in the decision. 
In part because the pre-ballot deliberations were marked by passionate internal 
disagreements over whether the coalition agreement was ‘social democratic 
enough,’xxxi there was hardly any debate about the more specific ways in 
which the agreement might impact on particular citizens’ interests. So there 
are certainly grounds on which the ballot may be faulted. But neither are these 
the grounds on which the ballot was publicly criticised, nor do they seem to 
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undermine the ballot’s overall democratic legitimacy; or so I have sought to 
show in this article. 
 
 
Conclusion 
I first suggested that there are at least two reasons to think that membership 
ballots are illegitimate in a representative democracy, to do with the 
constraints they place on representatives and the extent to which they limit the 
authority of the voters. I then examined these reasons and found that neither of 
them gives sufficient grounds for thinking that membership ballots are 
democratically suspect. Central to my argument was an ‘intrinsic value-
justification’ of intra-party democracy, which defends intra-party democracy 
on the basis that it instantiates equal respect for persons qua self-determining 
agents. Appealing to equal respect turned out to have several implications for 
the design of membership ballots. One was the requirement to provide a pre-
ballot procedure, in which different views about the issue on which the ballot 
is held can be voiced and debated. Another was the normative demand to 
include non-members into these procedures. I suggested that, except in cases 
where there is reasonable agreement that certain non-members have a stake in 
the decision, we should resist the equal respect principle’s pull towards 
inclusiveness. That is, internal deliberations prior to membership ballots 
should include non-members only when it is uncontroversial that they have 
high stakes in the decision. 
 The takeaway message of my argument is not so much that 
membership ballots are generally normatively unproblematic, but that parties 
ought to think carefully about issues of inclusiveness when holding such 
ballots. For always there is a case to be made that non-members have stake in 
an intra-party decision, yet only sometimes does including them seem 
normatively required. While I have not tried to provide a definitive rationale 
for defining the ‘boundaries of the party,’ I have hopefully managed to 
cultivate sensitivity to the issues at stake. Sensitivity to matters of 
inclusiveness seems vitally important at a time when parties increasingly 
render procedures of intra-party democracy open to non-members through 
such devices as open primaries or policy consultations with unaffiliated 
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supporters (Scarrow, 2014, ch. 8), and it is in this respect that the above 
discussion has implications for intra-party democracy more generally. If, as I 
have argued, the inclusion of those who have no formal ties to the party may 
lead to overinclusiveness and be unfair on the most committed members, it 
seems that parties that are internally exclusive are generally preferable to ones 
that are internally inclusive—that is, so long as there is no reasonable 
agreement on the stakes of certain non-members. This conclusion stands in 
opposition to the present institutional design orthodoxy, to be sure. But given 
the risks opening procedures of intra-party democracy to the wider citizenry 
holds, that orthodoxy might have to be reconsidered. 
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Notes
                                                 
i
 Since the early 1990s, parties across the democratic world have increasingly experimented 
with such ballots in order to give their members a more direct say over policy and personnel 
decisions (Scarrow 2014, pp. 181-186; for some in-depth case studies, see Sussman 2007). 
Prominent examples include the ballot held in 2004 by the French Socialist Party to decide the 
party’s position on a European Constitutional Treaty, and the ballot on the same topic that the 
Danish Socialist People’s Party held shortly thereafter. 
ii
 The speech is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=panAIYVmy54, retrieved 30 
November 2013. 
iii
 An interesting exception is Serbia, where members of parliament were bound (by 
imperative mandate) to enact the voters’s will until 2011. 
iv
 The German Basic Law is available online at 
http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/aufgaben/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetz/gg/245216, 
retrieved 11 November 2014. 
v
 Die Welt ‘Mitgliedervotum im Konflikt mit dem freien Mandat?’, 3 December 2013, 
available at http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article122525059/Mitgliedervotum-im-
Konflikt-mit-dem-freien-Mandat.html, retrieved 4 December 2013. 
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vi
 The SPD statute is available online at https://www3.spd.de/linkableblob/1852/data/, 
retrieved 20 December 2015. 
vii
 My analysis here is indebted to the excellent discussion of Burke’s representation theory in 
Rehfeld (2009). 
viii
 The German constitution registers these demands more explicitly. Article 38 (1) of the 
German Grundgesetz has a rider that sets forth that MPs are ‘representatives of the people as a 
whole’. 
ix
 Stroud’s paper originally discusses the obligations people incur in friendships. On the 
conceptual resemblance of partisanship and friendship, see Beerbohm 2011, pp. 136-139; 
Muirhead 2014, ch. 5; Ypi, forthcoming. 
x
 Consider Samuel Beer’s description of party discipline in the British Parliament: ‘In the 
House of Commons were two bodes of freedom-loving Britons, chosen in more than six 
hundred constituencies and subject to influences that ran back to an electorate that was 
numbered in the millions. (…) Yet day after day with a Prussian discipline they trooped into 
the division lobbies at the signals of their Whips and in the service of the authoritative 
decisions of their parliamentary parties’ (Beer 1982, pp. 350-351). 
xi
 This is a common practice in the German context. Empirical studies reveal that parties in 
the Bundestag regularly enforce Fraktionsdisziplin, and thus make deviant voting behaviour 
relatively rare (Sieberer 2010).  
xii
 BVerfG, Beschluss der 2. Kammer des Zweiten Senats vom 06. Dezember 2013- 2 BvQ 
55/13 - Rn. (1-12). The full text of the verdict is available here: 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2013/12/qk20131
206_2bvq005513.html, accessed 5 December 2015. 
xiii
 That is, if we consider Burke’s 1774 Speech to the Electors of Bristol to be representative 
of his views. Burke was on the other hand also a defender of political parties, which makes his 
position seem inconsistent in many respects. On Burke’s defence of parties, see Rosenblum 
(2008, pp. 119-126).  
xiv
 Note in this connection that § 13 (6) of the SPD’s party statute is formulated at a very gen-
eral level. It is not specifically addressed to elected representatives in the national legislature. 
Instead, as laid out in § 13 (9) of the statute, membership ballots can be held at ‘every [hierar-
chical] level of the party’ (for the source, see fn. 5), and so the stipulation that they are 
‘binding’ will mean different things in different contexts. Put in another way, membership 
ballots may be more or less binding depending on the level of the party at which they are held. 
For example, in local politics, where the constitutional ban on imperative mandate does not 
necessarily apply—it applies to Landtage, the legislative assemblies of German federal states 
but not (say) to local councils, where membership ballots may reasonably be held—the 
‘bindingness’ of a ballots outcome may apply with full force to individual partisans. 
xv
 Often these interpretations referred to nationwide polls, in which a majority of the respond-
ents expressed support for the grand coalition. But of course, to say that voters voted in favour 
of a grand coalition is in itself a problematic assumption as voters are standardly thought to 
vote for parties or policy platforms, but not for coalitions as such. 
xvi
 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung ‘Undemokratisch’, 23 November 2013, available at 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/harte-bretter/das-spd-mitgliedervotum-undemokratisch-
12677011.html, retrieved 25 November 2013. 
xvii
 Why this is so can be seen by looking at a paradigm commitment, namely a promise. If 
you have promised your kids to go to the cinema on Friday evening (and thus instilled in them 
the intention that we are going to see a movie together) there is a clear sense in which you will 
not decide simply on the merits what to do on Friday evening. Instead, your promise serves as 
a relatively fixed point that constrains your field of available options, as described in the pre-
vious sub-section. It creates, to put matters slightly differently, pro tanto reasons regarding 
how you can permissibly behave with respect to your promisees. 
xviii
 Note that in Germany’s federal system mechanisms of candidate selection and intra-party 
delegation vary across the state’s different federal levels, see Detterbeck (2013) and Hazan 
and Rahat (2010, p. 46). 
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xix
 While this is generally overlooked in the normative literature on representation, which 
tends to pay little attention to the complex workings of political parties, scholars of intra-party 
democracy have rightly highlighted that, properly conceived, the parliamentary chain of dele-
gation starts with candidate selection (Hazan and Rahat 2010, p. 12). This was initially meant 
as a purely empirical observation, but the arguments laid out here suggest that candidate selec-
tion also assumes normative relevance in that the transactions between party members and 
aspiring election candidates legitimately confer authority onto party members. 
xx
 In a much-discussed TV interview in the ZDF-Heute Journal on 28 November 2013, for 
example, TV anchor Marietta Slomka argued that it be questionable from a democratic per-
spective that in the intra-party referendum 477,000 registered party members could potentially 
overrule 12.840.000 SPD-voters, most of which are not members of the SPD. 
xxi
 A highly stylised rendering of this assumption would see party members, on the one hand, 
as ideological radicals, and voters, on the other hand, as rational pragmatists who demand that 
parties deliver policy. 
xxii
 I thank Chris Wratil for suggesting this point. 
xxiii
 There is nothing unfamiliar in this argument; indeed, arguments to this effect are re-
hearsed in some classic works on parties and intra-party democracy. See, paradigmatically, 
Michels ([1911] 1989). 
xxiv
 This is a common point in theoretical discussions of party. The focus is here usually on 
parties and public reason. Muirhead and Rosenblum (2006, p. 104) argue for instance that 
parties have ‘a foot in each sphere’ since they translate grievances manifest in society into 
distinctive conceptions of the common good, and so ‘refine and generalize particularist ap-
peals by casting them in terms appropriate to public reason.’ On this point, see also White and 
Ypi (2010, pp. 384-385). 
xxv
 In Germany, the country we mainly focus on here, parties appoint members to key position 
in the public sector and in semi-public institutions in order to secure policy implementation 
(John and Pogunkte 2012). For in-depth case studies of patronage, see the excellent volume by 
Kopecký et al. (2012). Note also that in most European democracies political parties are in 
some form acknowledged in the constitution—often key democratic principles such as politi-
cal participation, representation, pluralism and competition are almost exclusively defined in 
terms of party—thus being directly inscribed into the ‘basic structure’ of societies (Biezen 
2011). The German Grundgesetz, for example, contains a general requirement that parties’ 
internal organisation conform to democratic principles. 
xxvi
 Many of them expressed support for an alternative coalition between the SPD and the 
Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) as well as the far-left Linke party. See n-tv.de ‘SPD-Wähler 
wollen Große Koalition’, available online at http://www.n-tv.de/politik/SPD-Waehler-wollen-
Grosse-Koalition-article11830241.html. Also see Deutsche Welle ‘Skeptische Genossen - Die 
SPD und die Koalition’, available online at http://www.dw.de/skeptische-genossen-die-spd-
und-die-koalition/a-17172128, retrieved 29 December 2014.  
xxvii
 Die Zeit ‘SPD-Parteispitze auf Werbetour’, available online at 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2013-11/spd-mitglieder-cdu-koalition, retrieved 30 
December 2014.  
xxviii
 In the end, 75.96 per cent of the members voted in favour of the coalition. 
xxix
 I thank Lea Ypi for suggesting this argument. 
xxx
 The example draws on the discussion in Valentini (2015, p. 795). 
xxxi
 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung ‘Sieben Juso-Landesverbände gegen große Koalition’, 2 
Dezember 2013, available at http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/bundestagswahl/spd-
mitgliederentscheid-sieben-juso-landesverbaende-gegen-grosse-koalition-12691202.html, 
retrieved 10 December 2015. 
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